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Do individual and collective agreements make a difference? 
 
By Dick Grozier, Director Industrial Relations, Austrlian Business Ltd 
 
  
 
Australian Business Limited says ‘yes’ they do make a difference.   
 
The question is one which can be answered in a number of ways.  The phrase 
‘individual and collective agreements’ can be responded to by inviting one to 
distinguish between individual and collective agreements and to answer with respect to 
each class of agreement, or the phrase can be taken to refer to the regime of agreement 
making.  I have chosen to answer the question phrased in the latter way. 
 
The phrase ‘make a difference’ begs the question of what kind of difference.  
Differences can be positive or negative, and that judgment strongly depends upon the 
perspective of the person answering the question.  In the sense of having an impact –  
becoming a mainstream form of industrial regulation – the agreement making regime 
clearly has had an effect.  DEWRSB1 puts forward that, at 31 Dec 1999, an estimated 
2.44M employees were subject to federal certified agreements (current or continuing), 
and there are additional employees under state agreements.  It estimates that, at the end 
of 1999, only 22% of Australians in enterprises with 5+ employees were subject to 
award rates.   
 
Even those commentators who argue that the bargaining wave has crested do not argue 
that bargaining has not had a significant effect, in the sense that I am using the term, 
even if they would argue that bargaining will not continue to make inroads into 
workplace regulation, or that bargaining is in slight decline. 
 
Unfortunately the question of bargaining has become politicised to the detriment of 
reasoned analysis.  Australians seem to spend more time than other countries in fighting 
elections over the nature of the industrial regime; ‘industrial relations’ separates 
coalition from Labor and state from federal systems.  And out of all of this there seem to 
be no real decided principles – only political advantages.   
 
For example, in 1991, unions were strongly opposed to the then NSW government’s 
legislation which generally assessed agreements against statutory minima (wage rates 
were assessed against the award) rather than the award.  Yet the Victorian government’s 
Fair Employment Bill 2000 effectively provides statutory minima against which 
certified agreements will be assessed.  This bill has strong union support. 
 
The real issue posed by preferring legislated minima, as opposed to arbitrated minima, 
is whether, having regard to the balance of efficiency and equity, there are terms and 
conditions of employment which should be subject to a general minimum.  (There are 
then also second level issues such as how general minima might be altered over time). 
                                            
1 Agreement making in Australia under the Workplace Relations Act – 1998 and 1999, A report  
prepared by the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business and the 
Office of the Employment Advocate. 
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I have made these observations to draw attention to the political context in which the 
question of whether collective and individual agreements make a difference lies.  The 
current federal decentralised agreement-making system is under threat.  This is a system 
when encourages people to negotiate their own arrangements and which provides a 
diversity of ways of reflecting those arrangements.  Yet, it is less than 10 years since 
there was a broad consensus about the need to move away from the centralised award 
system and to provide greater access at the workplace for the parties to determine their 
own appropriate mix of conditions.   
 
This broad consensus arose painfully against the backdrop of the manifest failure of 
centralised award making once the pillar of trade protection was removed.  Whilst I 
freely concede that the move to establishment or enterprise bargaining started within the 
award system, I think that it would be difficult to argue that agreement making would 
become the norm under a system where the general award was king.    It is true that 
awards have become less prescriptive but they have done so under the pressure of the 
bargaining regime.  Reduce bargaining and the tendency to re-prescribe seems destined 
to remerge.   
 
Worse perhaps, than restoring the centrality of awards, is to give greater significance to 
agreed industry settlements.   Agreements are often more prescriptive than awards – 
albeit with detail relevant to the local level, but they can also be changed at the 
workplace when it is appropriate.  Industry wide agreements would bring the 
generalised prescription typical of awards without the protection of merit in their 
making. 
 
So my first point is that individual and collective agreements make a difference by  
reducing the need and tendency to prescribe at the general level. 
 
And at Australian Business Limited we think the evidence is there to support the need 
for local arrangements.  We have identified a ‘virtuous circle’ which has emerged under 
the bargaining regime.  I don’t think that we have found something that no-one else has 
noticed but it does not seem to have been much remarked upon. 
 
Everyone is familiar with the concept of the ‘vicious circle’ where one bad thing leads 
and feeds into another with events spiralling downwards.  The opposite concept is the 
‘virtuous circle’ where a series of positive things lead and feed into one another to 
create positive outcomes.  ABL believes a number of positive policy directions have 
worked together to produce significant improvements in labour market outcomes and 
that maintaining the current focus on enterprise bargaining is a necessary ingredient for 
the perpetuation of this virtuous circle.   
 
It needs to be emphasised that ABL does not claim that enterprise bargaining is the sole 
cause of the improving labour market outcomes.  This would be to claim too much for 
any single policy.  Rather, enterprise bargaining is one of a number of policy settings 
that combine together to produce improving outcomes.   
 
Price and wage inflation 
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The high inflation of the 1980’s has been supplanted in the 1990’s with much lower 
rates of inflation.  Since the latter part of 1991 inflation has rarely been above 3%.  It is 
a basic tenet of enterprise bargaining that wage increases are linked to productivity 
gains as opposed to increases in the CPI.   However, it must conversely be said that 
practice of linking wage increases to productivity rather than increases in the CPI is 
itself assisted by sustainable low inflation.  If price inflation is significant, demands for 
wage increases to match price inflation would inevitably follow.  CPI changes since 
1980 show a low inflation environment over the last decade has corresponded to the life 
of formal enterprise bargaining. 
 
Source: ABS Catalogue 6401 
 
Comparing the CPI figures with available figures on wage inflation reveals that wage 
inflation has, for the most part and exceeded price inflation.  This is true of agreement 
outcomes and also of minimum wage outcomes.  It is also worth noting that since the 
introduction of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 there has been a modest downward 
trend in wages growth (average annualised wage increase – AAWI). 
 
The chart below compares AAWI for agreements struck in the quarter, with average 
weekly ordinary time earnings (full time adults) for the economy as a whole. 
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Source: ABS 6302; Department of Industrial Relations, Wage Trends in Enterprise Bargaining. 
 
Clearly, wage outcomes have been sufficiently low to prevent price inflation.  
 
Employment and unemployment 
 
Levels of unemployment remain an enduring concern of the community. 
Unemployment had risen to more than 11% in the early 1990’s and the rate of 
participation in the labour market had begun to fall.  Since 1993 the unemployment rate 
has fallen significantly and continues to fall.  In July 2000 unemployment was at its 
lowest rate for more than ten years.  
 
Labour market participation increased over the years of the Accord, but had begun to 
fall in the early 1990s. From 1993 the labour market participation rate has increased and 
remained relatively stable. 
Source: ABS 
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Again, a number of factors has contributed to these outcomes and ABL says that the 
advent of enterprise bargaining is one of these. 
 
Productivity  
 
Productivity growth tends to ebb and flow in cycles. Often, these movements are 
synchronised with the broader economic cycle.  Typically, when employment is 
growing strongly, labour productivity growth tends to be falling.  Whilst ABL does not 
think that economics has been turned on its head, Treasury’s quarterly labour 
productivity series shows labour productivity accelerating since the early 1990s. 
 
 
 
Source: Commonwealth Treasury  
 
Treasury’s quarterly real unit labour costs (conceptually equal to nominal wage growth 
less inflation less growth in labour productivity) show that real unit labour costs have 
fallen by 2.7% between the December quarter of 1996 and the March quarter of 2000. 
This welcome outcome seems largely the result of wages increasingly being determined 
by productivity. Undeniably, this in turn has been due to the moves towards enterprise 
bargaining ushered in the early 1990s.  
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Source: Commonwealth Treasury 
 
This long time real unit labour costs (‘RULC’) series shows that RULC fell throughout 
the first six years of the Accord.  During this period, total employment grew 
impressively.  In the following period, RULC are relatively stable, which in recent times 
has allowed employees to receive real wage increases, while not raising real costs to 
employers. 
 
It is arguable that the major difference in labour market outcomes between the Accord 
years the enterprise bargaining era is that the enterprise bargaining era has brought 
significant real wage increases, delivered on the back of the linkage between wage 
increases and productivity.  In contrast the Accord delivered solid results in terms of 
employment and unemployment while real wages fell. CPI movements were ahead of 
Average Weekly Earnings for most of the Accord years with the position reversed under 
the enterprise bargaining era. 
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Source : ABS 6401, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin September 2000 
 
A retreat from enterprise bargaining that is accompanied by a break in the linkage 
between productivity and wage increases is likely to result in a severe weakening of the 
improved labour market outcomes observed during the last decade of enterprise 
bargaining.  While the Accord produced some impressive outcomes in terms of 
employment and unemployment, particularly before the recession, the corresponding 
decline in real wages is to be contrasted with the outcomes under enterprise bargaining.   
 
Another aspect to the virtuous circle 
 
While the evidence discussed above establishes the labour market benefits of enterprise 
bargaining as a whole, a legitimate question arises in relation to whether such benefits 
have been visited on groups of workers such as female, non-English speaking 
background, young and part-time employees.  The joint DEWRSB/OEA Report found 
that, on balance, formalised agreement making has not worked to the disadvantage 
women, NESB, part-time and young employees.   
 
The report showed that: 
 
 A broader examination of gender wage outcomes shows a narrowing of gender wage 
differences in agreements during 1998 to 1999 and, more generally, since the 
introduction of the Workplace Relations Act. 
 
 Women, NESB employees and young people had similar or greater access to the 
main conditions of employment in agreements (such as leave entitlements, hours of 
work provisions, superannuation).  Part-time employees had similar or slightly less 
access to these provisions. 
 
 Overall, most family-friendly and equity provisions show a positive outcome for 
designated groups during 1998 to 1999 compared to the last reporting period. 
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 In collective agreements made directly with employees, females, part-time 
employees and NESB employees enjoyed greater access to the main conditions of 
employment while young people had a lower rate of coverage in relation to just over 
one half of the provisions. 
 
 Many of the differences in access to the main employment conditions provisions in 
agreements experienced by young people can be partly explained by the 
concentration of young people in certain industries, such as retail trade and the 
accommodation, cafes and restaurants industries. 
 
I have said that ABL thinks that a decentralised bargaining regime is important and I 
have suggested that it has been associated with social and economic benefit and that 
these benefits should not be put at risk.  However there is less understanding about how 
bargaining operates at the enterprise level.  ABL has also put its money where its mouth 
is.  Under the Strategic Partnerships Industry Research and Training Scheme ABL is an 
industry partner with ACIRRT in a three year longitudinal study of bargaining outcomes 
amongst ABL members.  This research is attempting to answer two questions 
 
 Why do workplaces adopt the particular forms of industrial regulation that they do?; 
and 
 
 What impact, if any, do different types of industrial agreements have on workplace 
processes and outcomes? 
 
The longitudinal study is primarily survey based with some case studies which will look 
at processes not easily susceptible to survey inquiry.  The same members will be 
surveyed during the project concerning their form of industrial regulation, who was 
involved and their views about objectives and outcomes.  Because the study is 
longitudinal, it can pick up changes in the form of regulation at individual workplaces. 
So that if, say, small businesses learn about bargaining by moving from an informal 
contract system to (say) AWAs this should be picked up.   
 
The first round of results has just been finished and made public. 
 
Respondents were asked to identify which of an identified range of forms of regulation 
(award, agreement or arrangement) applied at their enterprise and which was the ‘main’ 
form of regulation, that is, which form of regulation covered the most employees and 
how many were covered by it.  The logic of ABL membership meant that weighted 
results are influenced by the number of small business members – which means that 
results by workplace differ from results by employee.  Thus, for example, about 42% of 
workplaces had awards as the main form of regulation, but only 37% of employees in 
the survey were in workplaces where awards were the main form of regulation.    
 
The sample was also asked where the main form of regulation came from – did 
workplace regulation come from the outside (external – awards without over-awards 
and agreements where the main idea for the agreement came from outside the 
workplace) or inside the workplace (internal – federal and state agreements, where the 
main idea did not come from outside, unregistered agreements or over-award 
arrangements, and verbal agreements).   57% of workplaces (62% of employees) were 
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subject to a main arrangement which was internally generated and 36% of workplaces 
and employees to a main arrangement which was externally generated.  
 
The 8% of workplaces (2% of employees) which reported there was no award or 
agreement was left as a residual category.  
 
Internal arrangements were disproportionately common amongst workplaces with 100+ 
employees and also, although less disproportionately, amongst workplaces with fewer 
than 20 employees.  Medium workplaces were disproportionately reliant on external 
arrangements. 
 
A number of other workplace characteristics were also examined, but time does not 
permit discussing them.  I wish to briefly look at several questions. 
 
 Why did workplaces without an agreement not have one? 
 
Size was important.  Few companies reported employee, union or management 
resistance.  Larger companies were either relatively happy with existing arrangements 
or did not feel the costs justified the benefits.  Smaller companies (less that 20) were 
more likely to cite lack of time/resources. 
 
 Is there bargaining fatigue? 
 
25% of respondents with a formal agreement with a union said that it was their first 
such agreement.  There were higher numbers of respondents with other forma of 
agreement – non-union certified agreement; AWAs unregistered collective agreements, 
individual contracts and verbal agreements reported that this was the first arrangement 
of this type.  Allowing for some cross over of types of arrangement, which I do not 
think is a significant factor, this could be taken to support figures that the rate of 
expansion of the bargaining regime is slowing.  DEWRSB figures support the view that 
the rate of coverage of agreements is slowing – although the number of employees 
under current agreements at 31 December grew from the previous quarter.  Similarly, 
the rate of increase of AWAs has slowed. 
 
The study asked about the range of issues which were subject to bargaining for those 
who had a non-award agreement.  They were asked whether the range of issues 
bargained over had increased or decreased compared to the issues in the last agreement 
of award. Except in the case of enterprise bargainers (those under NSW agreements) the 
majority stated that the range of issues stayed the same.  Only about 10% stated that the 
range of issues represented a decrease.  Clearly most people had things to bargain about.  
However a decrease might not represent ‘fatigue’ since something like shift starting 
times, or family flexibility arrangements could be expected to remain stable over a 
longer time frame than a single agreement.  Agreement over an important matters might 
be pursued at the expense of diversity. 
 
 Who’s involved in bargaining? 
 
Typically the idea for the chosen type of  agreement came from management (56% of 
workplaces) and 25% of the time the idea came from employer organisations or 
consultants.  In 58% of workplaces negotiation involved employee representational 
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forms or tribunals.  There is clearly a size effect here and there may be some issue about 
what is understood about negotiation.  For present purposes I wish to take this at face 
value, since it suggests that if management is selecting the instrument, and often 
negotiation does not involve representative stakeholders, then management should be 
achieving its objectives. 
 
 What are management’s objectives and is it getting them? 
 
 20% wanted to improve workplace productivity and 24% wanted to consolidate 
changes or harmonise terms and conditions across the workplace.  Mangers were not 
seeking to cost cut (4%), nor to improve staff retention (6%).  They were asked about 
the effect of the agreement on profitability and labour productivity.  35% of workplaces 
reported improved profitability and 40% reported improved productivity.  Almost all the 
remainder said the agreement had no effect.  Where improvements were identified 
managers were asked what the main cause of the change was.  Changes to the 
organisation, work culture, products or services was the most common explanation for 
profitability change (30%) and productivity (27%) with improved skilled /motivated 
workforce was also common (23%).  These managers were somewhat more likely to 
have productivity measures in their agreements. 
 
The report concludes that agreements do not usually cause productivity or profitability 
improvements – these improvement arise from a multiplicity of factors -  but where this 
has occurred the agreement has typically contributed to the process. 
 
These are modest but important outcomes. 
 
 Satisfaction 
 
The report identifies a high level of satisfaction (satisfied/very satisfied) with the 
agreement (70%).  Only 6.2% were dissatisfied or felt it was too soon to tell.  (I should 
also point out that most of those reliant on awards tended to be satisfied (80%).  
Agreement satisfaction was lowest with union certified agreements (51% - 
dissatisfaction – 16%) and highest with unregistered written collective agreements 
(92%); non-union certified agreements 77%, verbal agreements 76% and NSW 
agreements sat on the average (70%). 
 
So what are we to make of all this? 
 
The impression presented by this data is that most ABL employers had relatively modest 
ambitions regarding the outcomes of enterprise bargaining. A majority of respondents 
were unable to confirm that their agreement had a positive impact on the achievement of 
various goals (although of those who saw productivity or profitability improvement the 
majority saw the agreement as playing a part)  but they were nonetheless satisfied with 
their agreement.  Why are they satisfied? 
 
Two possible hypotheses emerge.  One hypothesis is that agreements provide the 
opportunity to formalise workplace practices, to consolidate change, they facilitate or 
legitimise change.  This needs further research given it is seen as a desirable outcome.  
Another hypothesis is that satisfaction arises from the array of choice employers now 
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have.  That is, employers are satisfied with the regime of choice allowing them to 
choose the most appropriate instrument or arrangement for their circumstances.   
 
ABL sees the diversity of responses as supportive of this hypotheses, but again more 
research is needed.  Some further evidence on this hypothesis may come from the 
longitudinal survey. 
 
The industry partners are currently examining the basis for supporting case studies.  
Case studies were always contemplated in the project design, but the first results raise 
the question of their exact focus and whether there should be some increase in the 
number of studies.  Clearly the dynamics of bargaining and the question of how 
agreements facilitate or legitimise change, and indeed, quite what this means, remains to 
be teased out.  Case studies could also throw light on the range of choice hypotheses as 
well.  
 
While it raises a number of questions concerning the process of workplace regulation, 
the research, as it stands, supports the view that range of choice is important and that 
collective and individual agreements do make a difference. 
 
